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I. INTRODUCTION

Profit sharing benefits are a source of income upon which employees' rely
and place a significant value.1 Employees value their profit sharing benefits
because these benefits enhance their financial security, especially after

retirement, by operating as a source of supplementary income.2 Depending
upon the provisions within a profit sharing plan, an employee can become
eligible for profit sharing benefits either during employment or at termination
from employment. 3 There is, however, no guarantee that employees who
would normally be entitled to their profit sharing benefits at termination, will
1See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1), 401(a) (West 1994); seealso Thomas E. Wood, Setting Objectives
for Profit SharingPlans, in GUIDE TO MODERN PROFIT SHARING 17 (1973).
2

Robert V. Thonander, Variations of the Profit Sharing Theme, in GUIDE TO MODERN
PROFIT SHARING 1 (1973).
3

1d.
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indeed receive the total benefit credited to their profit sharing account when
4
they terminate from employment.
Most profit sharing plans provide that the nonvested 5 portion of an
employee's profit sharing benefit can be forfeited when the employee incurs a
break in service. 6 A break in service often results in termination. 7 Employees
can also break their service with an employer by quitting, retiring, dying,
becoming disabled, getting laid-off, or being discharged for cause. 8 Some of
these methods of incurring a break from service are voluntary while others are
involuntary. 9 Whether an employee's profit sharing benefit can be forfeited
may depend on whether his break in service was voluntary or involuntary.10
The issue that will be addressed here is whether a break in service that occurs
because of a natural disaster should result in the forfeiture of an employee's
nonvested profit sharing benefit. Part one will focus on the effects of a natural
disaster on employment. Part two will discuss the operation of a profit sharing
plan. Part three will examine the nature of involuntary terminations. Part four
will evaluate court decisions on how break in service rules should apply to
involuntary terminations. Part five will propose a statutory amendment to the
break in service rule. The conclusion will then recommend how break in service
rules should be applied to terminations which occur as a result of a natural
disaster.
II. THE EFFECTS OF A NATURAL DISASTER UPON EMPLOYMENT

A natural disaster is a force of nature-such as a tornado, an earthquake, a
hurricane, or a flood-which occurs without any human intervention and

4

See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d

344 (9th Cir. 1990).
5
Nonvested benefits are the portion of an employee's total profit sharing benefit
which can be forfeitedwhen the employee terminates from service. See James R. Simone,
Statutory Framework, Language and Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ERISA, in

INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS 1989 15 (Tax Law &

Practice Course Handbook Series No. 289,1989).
6

See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
7
Van Fossan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Union Local No. 710 Pension Fund,
649 F.2d 1243, 1244 (7th Cir. 1981); Vermeulen v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 490 F. Supp. 234, 235 (M.D. N.C. 1980).
8

Edwin F. Boynton, The Vesting Schedule, in GUIDE TO MODERN PROFIT SHARING 79,
82 (1973).
9

Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that an
employee who had been laid-off was involuntarily terminated); see also Vermeulen v.
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 490 F. Supp. 234 (M.D.
N.C. 1980) (finding that an employee who quit his job had voluntarily terminated his
employment).
10

See, e.g., Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1971).
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cannot be prevented by reasonable care or due diligence."1 Natural disasters
usually cause property as well as human damage. 12 In addition, natural
disaster can disrupt the lives of individuals as well as the operations of
businesses.

13

As a means of demonstrating good business practice, an employer may plan
for the disruptions that a natural disaster can generate by undertaking strategic
defenses and managerial approaches that can overcome the unforeseen
repercussions of a natural disaster.14 Planning for the occurrence of a natural
disaster has become imperative since there has recently been and may continue
to be a rise in the number of occurrences of natural disasters in the United
States. 15 These natural disasters have not only increased in volume but also in
severity.16 For example, in 1992 there were a record 1,297 tornadoes in the
United States.17 Also in 1992, Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Iniki struck
18
South Florida and Hawaii respectively, causing millions of dollars in damage.
The United States Small Business Administration's (hereinafter SBA)
disaster assistance program made loans totaling $847 million to the more than
18,000 businesses that were affected by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and other
disasters. 19 The total SBA loans in 1992 were almost double the $443 million in
loans made by the SBA in the previous year for disaster relief. 20 In addition, in
the summer of 1993, six states along the Mississippi River experienced major
flood damage. 21 The flood submerged 17,000 square miles of land and caused
$12 billion in property damage. 22 Because of these natural disasters, families

11

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 33 (6th ed. 1990).

2

1 Kai Erikson, After the Flood: How Long Can a DisasterLast?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6,
1993, at 14.
13 Sharon Nelton, Preparefor the Worst, NATION'S Bus., Sept. 1993, at 20; see also
Rosalind Resnick, ProtectingComputers and Data, NATION's Bus., Sept. 1993, at 26.
14

ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR. & A. J. STRICKLAND III, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
CONCEPTS AND CASES 4 (6th ed. 1992).
15

Stephen Petranek, The Force of Nature, LIFE, Sept. 1993, at 31.

6

1 Id.
17 Id. at 36-37.
18 Nelton, supra note 13, at 21.
19

1d.

20

Id.

21Andy Neff, Flood Victims Keep Weathering the Storm, NATION'S CITIEs WKLY., July
12, 1993, at 1.
22

Erikson, supra note 12.
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and individuals were displaced from their homes, 23 and thousands of
businesses were temporarily or permanently damaged. 24
Some businesses in the areas affected by a natural disaster incur structural
damage. 25 The structural damage, at times, forces these businesses either to
cease or to reduce the level of their operations. 26 A cessation or reduction in
operations frequently leads to a reduction in the number of workers needed by
the businesses. 27 A significant number of workers can, therefore, become
unemployed after an area is struck by a natural disaster.28 For example,
Hurricane Andrew caused severe structural damage to 1,200 businesses in
South Florida. 29 Many of these businesses did not terminate operations because
of the structural damage. 3 0 Instead, these businesses continued operating by
setting up offices and stores in trailers. 31 In cases where the trailers were
significally smaller than the original structures, fewer employees were needed
to operate the business.3 2 Thus, a reduction in the areas workforce ensued.33
One clear aftermath of the natural disaster caused by Hurricane Andrew was
the termination of a large number of workers in South Florida.34
Some of those employees who became terminated as a result of natural
disasters like Hurricane Andrew had been participants in company sponsored
profit sharing plans.35 Whether those employees were entitled to any of their
profit sharing benefits upon termination depended upon the terms of their
respective plans. Most profit sharing plans specify that employees who are not
entitled to their nonvested employer contributed benefits at the date of their

23

1d.

24

Nelton, supra note 13.

25

See, e.g., Gus Carlson, Jobless in South Florida,MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 1993, at lk.

26

See Nelton, supra note 13.

27

See Gregg Fields, Dade's Job Exodus: Labor Force Has Shrunk Since Storm, MLAMI
HERALD, Jan. 1, 1993, at 1C.
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

See Oscar P. Musibay, Homestead Businesses Tackle Back, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12,
1992, at KE.
31
32

d.
Interview with Earl G. Haynes, Store Manager, Rite Aid Pharmacy, in Miami, Fla.

(Dec. 24, 1993).
33

34

1d.

See supra note 27.

35

Interview with Sonia E. Haynes, Store Manager, Life Uniform Stores, in Miami,
Fla. (Dec. 24,1993).
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separation, will forfeit those benefits. 36 Moreover, nonvested employer
contributed benefits can only be forfeited if the employee is unable to return to
work with the plan sponsoring employer one year or more after the break in
service commenced. 37 On the other hand, an employee cannot forfeit profit
sharing benefits derived from his own contributions to a profit sharing plan.38
Employee contributions are always fully vested and, therefore, can never be
forfeited.3 9 Thus, profit sharing plans make a distinction between an
employee's right to his own contributions to the profit sharing plan as opposed
to the contributions that employers make to profit sharing plans on behalf of
their employees.
The profit sharing plan provision which executes a forfeiture upon
nonvested employer contributions when an employee incurs a break in service
is commonly termed the break in service rule (hereinafter the rule).40 Currently,
under profit sharing plans that include a break in service rule, those employees
who have been separated from service for one year or more, due to a natural
disaster or otherwise, will forfeit the nonvested portion of their employer
contributed profit sharing benefits. 4 1 In order to illustrate the significance of a
loss of nonvested profit sharing benefits to employees, a discussion of the
operation of profit sharing as a part of an employee's total compensation
package follows.
III. PROFIT SHARING PLANS

A single-employer profit sharing plan is established and maintained by an
employer to enable employees or their beneficiaries to participate in the
organization's profits.42 A profit sharing plan is a program by which
employees' receive a share of the employer's profits in addition to their regular
compensation. 43 With a single-employer plan (hereinafter employer) only
one employer, typically an employer operating for a profit, contributes to the

36

Stephen T. Lindo, Introduction to Qualified Plans: ERISA Vesting Rules, in

INTRODUCTIONTO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFITSHARING PLANS 1989193,217 (Tax

&Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 289,1989).

Law

37

1d. at 212.

38

Max J. Schwartz, Introduction to Qualified Plans: Minimum Vesting Standards, and
Service Counting, in INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS
1986 at 159, 169 (Tax Law &Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 242, 1986).
39
1d.; see also Simone, supra note 5, at 15.
40
See, e.g., Cann v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 662 F. Supp. 501, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
affd, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).
41
Lindo, supra note 36, at 211, 217.
42

JOSEPH J. MELoNE & EVERETt T. ALLEN, JR., PENSION PLANNING: PENSIONS, PROFIT
SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 288 (1966).
43

Thonander, supra note 2, at 1.
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plan.44 The portion of the organization's profits received by employees are
referred to as their profit sharing benefit.4 5 Employees who participate in an
employer maintained profit sharing plan are called the plan's participants. 46
Depending upon the provisions in the profit sharing plan, employees may
automatically become plan participants or may elect to become plan
47
participants.
There are three basic types of profit sharing plans. 48 Profit sharing plans can
be cash plans, deferred plans or combination plans.49 Cash plans pay out
profits directly to employees in the form of cash, checks, or stock as soon as
profits are determined.50 Deferred plans credit profits to a trust account for the
benefit of employees. 51 The funds in a deferred plan are paid at retirement or
before retirement under circumstances allowed by the plan. 52 Under
combination plans, part of the profits are paid out currently in cash and the
remainder is deferred.53 Only deferred plans and the deferred component of
combination plans will be discussed here since only these two plans employ
break in service rules.
Employers customarily compensate employees for the jobs they perform. 54
Profit sharing is a fringe benefit55 that is not generally distributed at the same
time that an employee's regular compensation is paid.5 6 Instead, employers
typically provide profit sharing benefits to employees in order to accomplish
certain organizational objectives that are not produced or sufficiently provided

44

Cf. Richard D. Brown, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans Distinguished, in
INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS 1989 81, 92 (Tax Law
& Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 289, 1989); I.R.C. § 414(f) (West 1994) (defining
multi-employer plans).
45

See Robert L. Meyer, Profit Sharing Compared with Pensions, in GUIDE TO MODERN
PROFIT SHARING 7, 9-10 (1973).
46
A plan participant is "an employee, or former employee, whose service gives or
has given rise to accru[ed]... benefits, whether or not [the employee] vests under [the]
plan." RICHARD A. WESTIN, LEXICON OF TAX TERMINOLOGY 503 (1984).
47

Brown, supra note 44, at 123.

48

MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 42, at 288.

49

1d.

50

1d.

51id.
52Id.
53

MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 42, at 288.

54

Wood, supra note 1, at 18.

55

A fringe benefit is"a colloquial term used to describe noncash benefits conferred
to employees." WESTIN, supra note 46, at 300
56 Wood, supra note 1.
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for by regular compensation. 57 One of the primary reasons for implementing
58
profit sharing plans is to attract and retain qualified employees.
A. Statutory Requirements
The structure and terms of a qualified profit sharing plan are dictated by
federal laws, specifically, the Internal Revenue Code of 198659 (hereinafter Tax
Code) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197460 (hereinafter
ERISA). 6 1 ERISA was enacted to protect employee rights to retirement benefits

while the Tax Code offers tax incentives to employers and employees for
employee benefit programs. 62 In order to institute a profit sharing plan that
will obtain preferential tax treatment, the plan must legally qualify as a profit
sharing plan. 63 "In... recent years, other laws not connected with taxation [or
employee benefits] have also played a material part in the operation of profit

sharing plans."64 Among these are laws concerning equal pay,65 civil rights, 66
disclosure,6 7 and reporting. 68 There are also some state laws which affect profit
sharing plans such as those relating to trusts69 and the protection of creditors. 70

57

Thonander, supra note 2, at 2.

58

Other
1.
2.
3.
4.

reasons for implementing profit sharing plans are as follows:
To serve as an incentive which can increase employee productivity.
To defer current income taxes and accumulate a capital reserve.
To maximize the capital reserve through the use of a tax exempt trust.
To provide retirement income and benefits for employees in the event
of separation from service with the employer prior to retirement.
6. To enhance the company's image as a socially responsible employer.

5926 U.S.C. §§ 401-19 (1988).
6029 U.S.C. §§ 1001-71 (1988).
61

Schwartz, supra note 38, at 161.

62

Julie L. Bloss, ERISA: An Overview for Non-ERISA Attorneys, A.B.A. J., May 1989, at

72.
63

Walter H. Brummund, Legal Requirements and Considerations,in GUIDE TO MODERN
PRoFiT SHARING 23 (1973).
64

1d. at 24.

65

See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).

66

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).

67

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988).

68

Brummund, supra note 63; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988).
See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 724 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); see also CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6320 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
69

70Brummund, supranote 63, at 24;see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.115 (West 1987
& Supp. 1995).
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Nevertheless, "it is the federal laws which most influence and control profit
sharing [plans]."71
The Tax Code specifies minimum standards that a profit sharing plan must
75
meet with regard to eligibility,72 vesting, 73 benefits, 74 contributions,
allocations,7 6 and nondiscrimination. 77 When a plan meets the minimum
standards specified by the Tax Code the plan is said to be "qualified" for tax
advantages under the Tax Code.78 Tax advantages are only afforded to plans
which defer payment of compensation (deferred and combination plans).79
The Tax Code also regulates the terms and operations of a profit sharing plan. 80
According to the Tax Code, money must be set aside, by the employer,
specifically for the profit sharing plan.81 The Tax Code also stipulates that the
money must be set aside on a recurring basis; that is, the contribution cannot
be a one shot deal.82 Additionally, even if the employer acquires profits for a
given year, the employer can decide not only whether to contribute a share of
those profits to the plan, but also how much to contribute.8 , Under the Tax
Code, the plan must also contain a definite formula for allocating contributions
among its participants. 84 All the provisions of a qualified profit sharing plan
are required to appear embodied in a comprehensive document which should
85
be provided to employees.
B. Deferred Plans
Deferred profit sharing plans primarily set aside capital in reserve that can

be used by employees for a variety of financial needs. 86 For example, the

71Brummund, supra note 63, at 24.
72

1.R.C. § 401 (West 1994).

73

1d. § 411.
1d. § 401.

74
75

1d. § 404.
1d.§ 358(b).

76

77

Brummund, supra note 63, at 26; see also I.R.C. § 401 (West 1994).

78

Brummund, supra note 63, at 26.

79

Id.
Id.

80
81

id.

82Id.
83
84

Brummund, supra note 63, at 26.
Id.

85Id.
86Thonander, supra note 2, at 4.
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deferred income may be used by employees as their only source of retirement
income or the deferred income may supplement other retirement income. 87 A
portion of a plan participant's account may even become available for
withdrawal before retirement as long as the participant remains employed with
the employer.88 In addition, the deferred benefits may serve, after an
employee's death, as a source of income for surviving family members.89
According to the Tax Code, a deferred profit sharing plan must be embodied
in a trust account. 90 The employer is the donor or creator of the trust, and the
employees are the trust beneficiaries. 91 A trustee must be designated or
92
ascertainable in order for the plan to satisfy the legal requirements of a trust.
The trustee may be a corporation, a trust company, or an individual. 93
1. Employer Contributions
One of the reasons why employers establish deferred profit sharing plans is
to utilize the tax advantages which these plans receive. 94 For example,
employer contributions to the profit sharing trust account are deductible as a
business expense. 95 An employer may treat up to fifteen percent of the total
contribution made to the trust account as a business expense.9 6 The amount of
the employer contribution can then be deducted from the employer's taxable
income. 97 This deduction will lessen the amount that the employer pays in
federal income taxes.
Contributions to the trust account are based on an employer's profits, and
are made by the employer.98 Typically, at the end of each plan year,9 9 the
employer determines the amount of the organization's profits that will be

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

1d.

90

Brummund, supra note 63, at 29.

91

1d.

92

See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6321 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).

93

Brummund, supra note 63, at 29.

94

1d. at 27.

95

Thonander, supranote 2, at 2.

96

1R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(West 1994).

97

Id. § 401(k).

98

MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 42, at 292.

99
A plan year is any consecutive twelve month period designated by the plan during
which the plan participant has completed at least 1,000 hours of service. I.R.C. §

411(a)(5)(A) (West 1994).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
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contributed to the profit sharing trust account 10 0 The employer then decides
the basis upon which his contributions to the plan will be allocated to all of the
plan's participants. 10 1 The employer's total contribution must be divided to
allow each participant's account to be credited with a share of the
contribution. 102
Each participant's share is credited to a separate account, although a separate
employee account does not actually exist. 103 The allocation of employer
contributions to the profit sharing account of each employee who participates
in the plan is usually based on the level of compensation (wage or salary) of
each employee, or a combination of the employee's compensation and years of
service. 104 If the employer decides to use compensation as the basis for his
allocations, then allocations will be made based on the proportion of each
participant's compensation to the total compensation of all the plan's
participants. 105 The most popular allocation techniques are those based on
compensation. 106 Profit sharing allocations which weigh years of service in
their calculations are not as popular since they tend to favor long term
employees. 07 Plans which make allocations based on years of service are thus
carefully scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service. 108
The allocation techniques described above are used to ascertain the
employee's share of contributed profits for accounting or record keeping
purposes.109 A participant's share of the profit sharing account can be increased
by: (1) additional annual contributions made by the employer to the account;
(2) interest earned if the funds are invested; (3) appreciation of the funds; and
(4) reallocations to remaining participants of funds forfeited by terminated
employees. 110

10 0

MELONE

& ALLEN, supra note 42, at 292.

101d.
102 Id.
103 1d. at 293.
104 Id. at 292.
10 5

A participating employee who earns $30,000 per year when the total annual
compensation for all participants is $3,000,000 would be credited with 1% of the
employer's total annual contribution if compensation is the sole criteria used to allocate
employer contributions. MELONE & ALLEN, supranote 42, at 292. Under this system, an
employer who contributes $100,000 to the profit sharing trust account would credit
$1,000 to the account of a participant who earns $30,000 per year. Id.
106

Id.
1 Brown, supra note 44, at 124.
07

108

Id.

09

1 MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 42, at 293.
110

d. at 310.
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An employee may not be immediately entitled to his share of the employer's
profits even though funds have been credited to the trust account on the
employee's behalf.111 Instead, the plan's provisions will determine when the
employee will become entitled to his share of the credited funds. 112 The Tax
Code, however, has stipulated that a participant's profit sharing benefits
derived from employer contributions must be nonforfeitable when the
participant attains the normal retirement age.113 As a result, a plan participant
is entitled to all of the funds credited to his account upon reaching the age of
65.114 Employers may, nonetheless, provide in their plans for a distribution of
benefits before a participant reaches the age of 65.115
2. Employee Contributions
Under the Tax Code, a trust account created as part of a profit sharing plan
may qualify for tax advantages if contributions are made to the trust by the
employer or the employees.11 6 Thus, employees are not required to contribute
to a plan in order for the plan to become qualified under the Tax Code. 11 7
Employees are allowed by some plans to make voluntary or matching
contributions. 118 Profit sharing plans that allow voluntary or matching
employee contributions are called thrift or savings plans.119 Employee
contributions, like employer contributions, also enjoy tax advantages under
qualified profit sharing plans.120 The employee can contribute to the plan by
designating a portion of earned income to the plan before those earnings are
subject to income taxes. 12 1
Employee contributions are made by way of deductions from pay.122 The
employer facilitates the pay deduction by withholding the portion of an
employee's earnings that have been earmarked for the profit sharing plan. 123
No personal income taxes are paid by the employee on the withheld earnings

111Id. at 293.
112

1d.

113See I.R.C. § 411(a)(West 1994).

ll4Id.
115 Brown, supranote 44, at 109.
116

1.R.C. § 401(a)(1)(West 1994).

117

1d.

118

I.R.C. § 401(m)(3)(A)(West 1994).

9

11 Thonander, supra note 2, at 4.
120

Brummund, supra note 63, at 28.

12 1

Brown, supra note 44, at 122.

22

1 Id.
123 Id.
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until the funds are distributed to the employee. 124 The employer then
accumulates all the withheld earnings and makes a lump sum payment to the
trust account on behalf of all the participating employees. 125 Employees not
only avoid income tax payment on the contributed earnings, but also avoid
income tax on funds in the trust account until those funds are distributed to
enjoys
the employee at retirement or upon withdrawal. 126 The employee12also
127 on these tax exempt funds. 8
interest
the benefit of compounded
C. Vesting
The dollar balance of a profit sharing plan is similar to the dollar balance of
a regular savings account, with one exception. Unlike the funds in a savings
12 9
account, the funds in a profit sharing account are not immediately accessible.
A participant's right to his employer's contributions is determined by the
vesting provision within the profit sharing plan. 130 Vesting is a concept
designed to ensure that a participating employee in a profit sharing plan will
receive a percentage of his accrued benefit 13 1 by making some or all of the
accrued benefits nonforfeitable. 132 The employer devises the vesting provision
for the profit sharing plan.133 However, the Tax Code has certain minimum
vesting standards that must be satisfied. 134
Depending on the vesting schedule 13 5 that the employer utilizes, a
participant can be either fully vested or nonvested. A participant who is fully
vested is entitled to 100% of his accrued benefit upon termination or upon

124

1d.

12 5

1d.

26

1 Brummund, supra note 63, at 27.
12 7

"Compound interest" is interest that is paid on both the funds deposited in the
account and any interest earned on those funds. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 286 (6th
ed. 1990).
12 8 Brown, supra note 44, at 122.
12 9 MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 42, at 294-95.
130See I.R.C. § 411(a)(West 1994).
131

Accrued benefits are "those contributions, expressed as a dollar figure or as an
annuity beginning at retirement, which [have] been earmarked for a particular
participant, and which that employee will receive in whole or in part, but only to the
extent he or she has a vested right in them." WESTIN, supra note 46, at 6.
132 WESTIN, supra note 46, at 823.
133 Boynton, supranote 8, at 82.
134

1.R.C. § 411(a) (West 1994).

135

A vesting schedule outlines "various mechanical rates at which vesting of accrued
benefits occurs." WESTIN, supra note 46, at 824.
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reaching the normal retirement age. 13 6 A participant who is nonvested is
entitled to less than 100% of his accrued benefit upon termination from
employment.
D. The Vesting Schedule
Prior to 1986, employers could fashion their vesting schedules after one of
three vesting schedules outlined in the Tax Code.137 The three vesting
schedules were as follows:
138
1. Ten year cliff vesting;
2. five to fifteen year vesting;139 and
3. the rule of forty-five vesting. 140
The Tax Reform Act of 1986141 (hereinafter the Act) amended the vesting
schedule requirement and required employers to utilize more rapid vesting
schedules in their profit sharing plans. 142 In place of the three vesting schedules
which were stipulated before the Act, two more liberal vesting schedules were
promulgated. 143 Congress reduced the number of years of service that counted
for vesting because the previous requirements tended to operate to the
disadvantage of female workers. 14 The two vesting schedules which can now
be adopted are as follows:
1. Five year cliff vesting;1 45 and
2. three to seven year graded vesting. 46

136Schwartz,

supra note 38, at 169.

137

1d. at 170.

138With a cliff vesting schedule "no vesting is required prior to the completion of ten
years of service at which time an employee [would] become 100% vested." Id. at 171.
139With a five to fifteen year vesting schedule "a participant [would] become vested
in increments [depending on the number of years of service]." Id.
140

With the rule of 45 vesting schedule "a participant with at least five years of service
and whose combined total age and years of service equals or exceeds forty-five [would]
become vested [based on the participant's position in a predetermined rate schedule]."
Id. at 172.
14126 U.S.C. § 411 (1988) (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
142See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(West 1994).
143

Id.

144See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,98 Stat. 1426.
145Five-year cliff vesting is a vesting schedule by which participants must be fully
vested in employer contributions after five years of service with the employer. I.R.C. §
411(a)(2)(West 1994).
146With three to seven year graded vesting, a participant must be vested in employer
contributions according to the following table:
Years of Service
Nonforfeitable Vested Percent
3 ...........................................
20

4...........................................
40
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Under the new five year cliff vesting schedule, a participant will be entitled
to 100% of his employer-contributed benefits after he has worked with the
participant will
employer for five years. 14 7 Before the fifth year of service, the
148
benefits.
employer-contributed
his
of
any
to
not be entitled
Under the three to seven year graded vesting schedule, a participant who
has worked for three years with the employer will be entitled to 20% of his
employer-contributed benefits. 149 Between the third and seventh year of
service, the percentage of benefits to which the participant will be entitled will
increase incrementally until the seventh year when the employee will become
fully vested. 150
The two vesting schedules outlined in the Tax Code are only guidelines. An
employer can, therefore, implement a vesting schedule which provides for
more rapid vesting.1 51 While an employer has some discretion in determining
a plan's vesting schedule, the152employer still has to meet the minimum
guidelines set by the Tax Code.
E. The Break in Service Rule
The Tax Code stipulates that all years of employment with the employer
maintaining the profit sharing plan must be included in computing an
employee's years of service. 153 A period where there is a break in service,
however, may be disregarded as a period of employment. 154

60
5............................................
80
6............................................
100
7 or more ...................................
Id. § 411(a)(2)(B). For example, an employee who is in a three to seven year graded plan
would have a nonforfeitable right to 40% of the benefits credited to his account after
four years of service. Therefore, if that employee had accrued benefits totalling $4,000,
the employee would be entitled to $1,600 at retirement or termination before retirement.
If the employee terminated in his fourth year and had not reached the normal retirement
age, then the employee would forfeit $2,400 in nonvested benefits.
147

d. § 411(a)(2).

48

1 "[A] participant who does not have any nonforfeitable right under the plan to an
accrued benefit derived from employer contributions" is called a nonvested participant.
Id. § 411(a)(6)(D)(iii).
149

See supranote 146.

150

See supranote 146.

151

I.R.C. § 411(a)(2) (West 1994).
152Id.
153Schwartz, supra note 38, at 192.
154 See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,98 Stat. 1426.
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A break in service is any vesting computation period 155 of twelve months or
more, designated by a profit sharing plan, in which a participant does not
complete more than 500 hours of service. 156 There can be no finding of a break
in service unless the employee incurs a break in service with the
plan-sponsoring employer for at least one year. 157 When a finding is made that
a plan participant has incurred a break in service, that participant's years of
service accumulated before the break will be disregarded (for vesting purposes)
unless that employee returns and completes a year of service with the
employer.158 When a plan disregards prior years of service accumulated before
a break in service or denies counting the break period as a period of
employment, that plan is applying a break in service rule. 159 A break in service
rule cannot apply to participants who are fully vested since no portion of the
participants accrued profit sharing benefit can be forfeited. When applied to
nonvested participants, a break in service rule can delay a participant from
becoming fully vested as well as cause the forfeiture of the plan participant's
nonvested benefit.160
The application of a break in service rule in a profit sharing plan can have
far reaching effects. The Tax Code states that a break in service merely causes
an employee's prior years of service to be disregarded.161 What the Tax Code
fails to state is that all the nonvested profit sharing benefits of a plan participant
will be forfeited when those prior years of service are disregarded. The Tax
Code also does not specify whether the circumstances that triggered the break
should be considered when an employer determines if an employee has
incurred a break in service.162 The Tax Code is also silent as to whether the

155

A vesting computation period is "the period used for determining credited service

for vesting purposes.

. ."
WESTIN,

supra note 46, at 824.

156

1.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(West 1994).

157

1d.

8

15 Upon the employee's return to covered employment, the employee's pre-break
and post break service will generally be required to be aggregated. See supra note 6. The
employee is also entitled to receive full credit for time spent in the re-entry waiting
period of service-that is the first year of service after the employee returns-if any part
of the employee's benefit derived from employer contributions was vested or if the
number of one year breaks in service was less than the number of years of service
completed before the break. Id.
159

See, e.g., Cann v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 662 F. Supp. 501, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
affd, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).
16OSee Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,98 Stat. 1426.
161

THE PROFIT SHARING COUNCIL OF AMERICA, GUIDE TO MODERN PROFIT SHARING 95

(1973).
162

IR.C.§ 411(a)(4)(D)(West 1994).
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voluntariness of a break needs to be considered by an employer when
determining if a separation from service constitutes a break in service. 163
Thus far, employers and plan administrators have been arbitrarily deciding
if an employee has incurred a break in service. 164 Employers and plan
administrators have defined the criteria that is being used to make a
determination of whether a break in service has occurred. 165 The primary
criterion that employers and plan administrators have been applying in

determining whether an employee has incurred a break in service is the
voluntariness of the break. 166 Thus, whether plan participants will forfeit all
their nonvested benefits as a result of a break in service due to a natural disaster

may turn on whether the break was voluntary or involuntary. However, a
finding that a termination was involuntary may not preclude the application
16 7
of a break in service rule.

IV. INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS
Whether a break in service due to a natural disaster is a voluntary or
involuntary termination has not been established either by statute or case
law.168 An examination of how the courts have classified breaks in service for
other purposes will facilitate the resolution of this issue.
Generally, the courts have found that breaks in service that are the result of
circumstances beyond the employees' control are involuntary. For example, in
Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan,169 a maritime worker brought an action against

his employee vacation benefits plan.170 The employee incurred a break in

163

See id. § 411(a)(6).

64

1 See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d
344, 346 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding a break in service if an employee becomes partially
disabled but not if an employee becomes totally disabled).
165See, e.g., Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82,84 (3d Cir. 1978) (defining a break in service
as a one year period during which a participant is not in covered employment);
Vermeulen v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 490 F. Supp.
234, 236 (M.D. N.C. 1980) (defining a break in service as any 36 month period during
which a participant is not in covered employment).
166 See, e.g., Bolton v. Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding a break in service when an employee terminated employment because of
a lay-off); Van Fossan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Union Local No. 710 Pension
Fund, 649 F.2d 1243,1244 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding a break in service when an employee
ceased working because of a shoulder injury).
167 See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d
344 (9th Cir. 1990); see alsoKnauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978).
168

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(West 1994); see also Van Fossan,649 F.2d at 1246 (applying
the arbitrary and capricious standard to determine if a break in service rule was
legitimately applied to the circumstance that triggered the employee's termination).
169632 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Md. 1986), rev'd, 832 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1987).
170Id. at 1490.
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service after he was laid-off, and was unable to find work in the maritime
industry for fifteen months. 171 The trustees' denied the employee's request for
vacation benefits because the plaintiff had incurred a break in service under
the plan provisions. 172 The employee alleged that the trustees' denial of his
vacation benefits was arbitrary and capricious. 173 The district court held that
the unavailability of jobs in the maritime industry was not of the employee's
own doing, therefore, his failure to work during the fifteen month period was
involuntary. 174 The district court stated that a break in service, which occurs
because of a lay-off, is due to no fault of the employee and is an involuntary
termination. 175
Similarly, in Siles v. ILGWUNationalRetirement Fund,176 an employee brought
an action against her pension fund for the invalid application of the pension
fund's break in service rule.177 The employee had been denied her pension
benefits because she failed to obtain covered employment 178 after she was
laid-off. 179 Although the Ninth Circuit did not find the break in service rule
invalid, the court held that the layoff constituted an involuntary termination. 180
Further, in Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund,181 a
disabled employee sued his pension fund to obtain pension benefits which he
had been denied after incurring a break in service. 182 The employee was denied
his pension benefits because he had broken his service with the employer
following a back injury.183 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to his pension benefits because he had indeed broken his service with
the employer under the plan's provisions.18 4 The Tafoya court recognized that
the employee's break in service was due to his back injury and, therefore, was

17 1

/d.

17 2

1d.

173

Id.

74

1 Whipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1490.
175
Id.
176783 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1986).
177 Id. at 929.
178
Covered employment is employment by an employer who has contributed to a
multiemployer pension fund. See, e.g., Cann v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 662 F. Supp.
501, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).

179 Siles, 783 F.2d at 930.
180

Id.

181909 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1990).
182

1d. at 346.

183

/d.

184Id. at 349.
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involuntary.185 Nonetheless, the circuit court found that the pension fund's
failure to consider the involuntariness of the plaintiff's break in service did not
render the break in service rule inapplicable. 186
Conversely, a majority of courts have held that breaks in service are
voluntary when the break is the result of circumstances which, although
beyond the employee's control, did not hinder the employee from performing
his job. For example, the district court in Dudo v. Schaffer187 held that the
employee's break in service which resulted from a minor back injury was a
voluntary break in service. 188 The employee in Dudo brought an action against
his pension fund after the trustees denied his application for pension
benefits. 189 The trustees denied the employee's request for pension benefits
claiming that the plaintiff had forfeited his right to any benefits when he
incurred a break in service. 190 The break in service arose when the employee
stopped working because of a back injury that was bothered by the lifting and
bending of his local driving job. 19 1 The district court held that medical evidence
showed that the employee was capable of performing the required lifting and
192
bending, therefore, the employee's termination was voluntary.
Court findings on the voluntariness of breaks in service have thus far been
based on whether the break was the result of circumstances beyond the
employee's control and whether those circumstances rendered the employee
incapable of performing his job.193 A natural disaster is beyond the control of
an employee. 194 A break in service which occurs as a result of a natural disaster
is likewise beyond the employee's control. If the natural disaster renders the
employee incapable of performing his job, then the succeeding break in service
will be involuntary and should be recognized as such. Hence, an employer will
need to determine how a break in service rule, if implemented, will apply to
involuntary breaks in service which are caused by a natural disaster.
An involuntary break in service due to a natural disaster is unlike other
involuntary breaks in service or terminations. For example, an employee who
is laid-off only has to contend with seeking other employment. After a natural
disaster, employees who were involuntarily terminated as a result of the

18 5 Id. at 348-49.

186 Tafoya, 909 F.2d at 348-49.
187551 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affid, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
18 8

d. at 1343.

18 9

d. at 1331-32.

190

d.

19 1

d. at 1343.

92

1 Dudo, 551 F. Supp. at 1343.
193 1d.
194See supra note 11.
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disaster, in addition to seeking employment, will need to rebuild their lives,
homes, and sometimes their communities. 195
Employers are also affected by natural disasters. 196 Many employers have
to engage in rebuilding their lives, homes, and businesses after a natural
disaster has struck. 197 A natural disaster can cause the termination of a greater
number of employees than, for example, a termination due to a disability.198
Employers, and sometimes employees, also know in advance when employee
lay-offs will occur.199 Both employers and employees can prepare for the
consequences of a lay-off. However, a natural disaster frequently occurs
without prior warning.200 Little, if any, preparation typically precedes a natural
disaster.20 1 Moreover, after a severe natural disaster, employees may not be able
to return to work for an indefinite period of time.202
An employer can forgo applying a break in service rule to employees whose
involuntary terminations are the result of a natural disaster. If the rule is
waived, then both vested and nonvested profit sharing benefits can be
distributed to terminated employees. An employer who decides to exercise a
break in service rule will, on the other hand, only be required to distribute
vested profit sharing benefits to the employees who were unfortunately
terminated as a result of the natural disaster. The nonvested benefits of
employees under a plan with a break in service will be forfeited. 20 3 The
forfeited benefits will remain in the profit sharing trust account and will later
be allocated and distributed to those employees who were fortunate enough
to remain with the employer.204 The remaining employees will, thus, incur a
windfall because of the application of the break in service rule.205
Employers can, if they wish, equitably provide for all plan participants'
affected by a natural disaster. Court decisions that deal with the issue of breaks
in service due to involuntary terminations can assist employers in charting

195Musibay, supra note 30, at KE.
196Id.

197

Id.

198See

Fields, supra note 27, at 1C.

199See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988) (mandating that employers give employees notice
of mass lay-offs).
20 0
Erikson, supra note 12, at 15.
201Nelton, supra note 13, at 20.
202 See Fields, supra note 27, at 1C.
203 See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
204
MELONE & ALLEN, supranote 42, at 310.
205Id.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994

19

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:509

provisions for breaks in service due to a natural disaster.206 Most of the court
decisions on break in service rules have been in relation to the application of
the rules to multi-employer pension plans. 207 Qualified profit sharing plans are
one form of pension plan. 208 Profit sharing plans are defined contribution
plans.209 The other form of pension plan is a defined benefit plan.210 The courts'
treatment of break in service rules within pension plans will also be applicable
to profit sharing plans.
V. COURT DECISIONS REGARDING BREAK IN SERVICE RULES

Prior to the enactment of ERISA, federal courts attempted to avert the
inequitable loss of pension benefits by plan participants. 211 The courts' strategy
was to impose a standard of reasonableness on the trustees who determine
participants' eligibility for pension benefits. 212 "A denial of benefits would be
reversed by the Court if the plaintiff demonstrated that the Trustee... had acted
213

in an 'arbitraryand capricious' manner."
The leading pre-ERISA case that dealt with whether a break in service rule
was arbitrary and capricious when applied to an involuntary break in service
was Lee v. Nesbitt.2 14 In Lee, a multi-employer pension trust was established for
the benefit of unlicensed seamen. 215 Under the trust provisions, the trustees
were given the discretion to establish requirements governing eligibility for
20 6

See, e.g., Bolton v. Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir.
1992); Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d 344 (9th
Cir. 1990); Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1987); Siles v. ILGWU
Nat'l Retirement Fund, 783 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1986); Dudo v. Schaffer, 720 F.2d 661 (3d
Cir. 1983); Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978).
207
See, e.g., Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1971) (involving employers who
were members of the maritime industry).
208 Bloss, supra note 62.
209 Defined contribution plans are plans "that provide[] an individual account for each
participant. [The] participant's benefit is determined by the value of his or her account,
which is based on the amount of contributions allocated to the account plus any income,
expenses and investment gains and losses charged to the account." Simone, supra note
5, at 13.
210
A defined benefit plan is a pension plan "that provides a definite and set formula
In defined benefit
under which the amount of a participant's pension is determined ...
plans the amount of the employer's contribution is actuarially determined each year...
[The benefits in this type of pension plan] are guaranteed by [the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation]." Simone, supra note 5, at 12.
2 11
See Van Fossan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Union Local No. 710 Pension
Fund, 649 F.2d 1243,1246 (7th Cir. 1981).
212/d.
2 13

1d. (emphasis added).

214453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1972).
2 15

d. at 1310.
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benefits. 216 The trust also had a rule that if a person did not work in covered
217
employment for at least 200 days, that person would incur a break in service.
A break in service would result in the cancellation of the employee's previous
pension credits.

2 18

In Lee, the employee suffered a break in service when he failed to work for
200 days between 1955 and 1957.219 The employee did not work during that
period because no employment was available. 220 The employee's break in
service was, therefore, involuntary. Nevertheless, the break in service resulted
in the forfeiture of the employee's credited service, and the loss of his pension
benefits. 221 The employee claimed that the break in service rule should not have
been applied to his involuntary termination and that such an application of the
rule by the trustees was unreasonable.2 22 The Ninth Circuit held that a break
in service rule was not per se invalid. 223 However, the court stated that a
determination of whether a break in service rule was applied arbitrarily and
capriciously would depend on whether or not the termination was
voluntary.224
A. Post-ERISA: Court Decisions
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review continued to be applied by
the courts subsequent to the enactment of ERISA. 225 The standard was
illustrated in Van Fossanv. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters Union Local No.
710 Pension Fund2 26 where a 60 year old employee who had accumulated 20.5
7
years of active service was denied his pension benefits by the plan's trustees.22
The trustees had denied the employee's application for pension benefits
because the employee had not been employed by a covered employer for a

2 16

1d. at 1310-11.

2 17

1d. at 1311.

218

Id.

219 Lee,
22 0
221

453 F.2d at 1311.

Id.
1d. at 1310-12.

222

1d. at 1311.
1d. at 1312; see also Bolton v. Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437,
1439 (9th Cir. 1992); Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund,
909 F.2d 344,348 (9th Cir. 1990); Van Fossan v. Intemational Bhd. of Teamsters Union
Local No. 710 Pension Fund, 649 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1981).
224
Lee, 453 F.2d at 1312.
223

225

Van Fossan, 649 F.2d at 1246.

22 6

1d. at 1243.

22 7

Id. at 1245.
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period of 156 consecutive weeks.228 According to the provisions of the pension
plan, an employee would incur a break in service and would lose all of his prior
credited service if he did not work in covered employment for 156 weeks
consecutively.

229

The employee, in Van Fossan, had ceased working because of a pain in his
shoulder.230 A shoulder injury, is a condition that would normally constitute
an involuntary termination.23 1 Applying the pre-ERISA arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, the Seventh Circuit found that "[a] distinction
between voluntary and involuntary breaks in service [is] crucial to determining
the arbitrariness of the operation of a given break in service rule."232 The court
233
stated that no break in service provision was arbitrary and capricious per se.
The application of a break in service rule to a circumstance beyond the
employee's control, the court stated, would, however, be found to be
arbitrary.234 Furthermore, the court stated that if the break in service of the
employee was involuntarily brought about, pre-ERISA case law would support
a finding of arbitrariness. 235 The court stated that a ruling to the contrary would
"permit [a] break in service rule to ... effectively eliminate [an] employee's right
23 6
to a pension."
In Bolton v. ConstructionLaborers'Pension Trust for Southern California,237 the
Ninth Circuit reiterated the ruling that whether a break in service rule was
invalid would depend on the voluntariness of the break.2 38 The employee in
Bolton was denied his pension benefits because of a break in service due to his
inability to find work that qualified under his employer's pension plan
provisions.2 39 The pension plan in Bolton was funded solely by employer
contributions.2 40 The court held that under a plan funded solely by employer
contributions, pension benefits could reasonably be denied to an employee
who failed to work the minimum number of years required by the pension
228

Id.

229

1d. at 1244.

230

Van Fossan, 649 F.2d at 1244.

23 1

See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 909 F.2d 344, 346 (9th Cir.
1990).
232
See, e.g., Van Fossan, 649 F.2d at 1248.
233

1d. at 1249.

234Id.
235Id.
236

1d. at 1248.

237954 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1992).
238

d. at 1440.

23 9

d. at 1438.

240

Id. at 1439.
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plan.241 In Bolton, however, the employee had worked for more than the
minimum number of years required by the plan.242 Moreover, funds had been
contributed to the plan by the employer as a result of the employee's efforts. 243
As a result, the court stated that the plan should provide for the determination
of whether the employee's break in service was voluntary before denying him
benefits.244 The court further stated that the employee could avoid forfeiture
of his pension benefits under the break in service rule if he proved that the
break in service was involuntary.245
A ruling by a federal court that a termination by a plan participant was
involuntary does not guarantee that the court will invalidate the application of
a break in service rule to that participant.246 For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Tafoya v. Western Conferenceof Teamsters PensionTrust Fund2 47 held that a pension
plan's break in service rule which provided pension benefits following certain
involuntary breaks in service, but not others, was valid. 248 Under the break in
service provision, a plan participant who stopped working because of a total
disability would not have a break in service charged to him.249 In contrast, a
participant who had at least a two year break in service due to a partial
disability would have his previously earned credits cancelled. 250
The employee, in Tafoya, had sustained an involuntary two year break in
service as a result of a back injury.25 1 Unlike the employee in Lee v. Nesbitt,252
the employee in Tafoya had not completed the minimum period of employment
required for vesting.253 The court, nevertheless, followed its holding in Lee that
"even if an employee, through no fault of his own, (was] prevented from
completing a minimum period of employment, he may be denied.. . pension
[benefits]."254 The court further stated that a break in service rule that excluded

241Id.; see, e.g., Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1971).
242

Bolton v. Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1992).

243Id.

244Id.
245

1d. at 1440.

246Id.

247909 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1990).
248

Id. at 346.

2491d.
2 50

d.

25 1

1d.

252453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1971).
253

See Tafoya, 909 F.2d at 349.

254

1d. at 348 (quoting Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1972)) (emphasis
added).
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a small percentage of involuntarily terminated employees would not be viewed
2 55
as arbitrary.
The court's ruling in Knauss v. Gorman,256 further demonstrates how a break
in service rule may be upheld when applied to an involuntarily terminated
employee. 257 In Knauss, an employee brought an action to recover pension
25 8
benefits denied him on account of the application of a break in service rule.
2
59
The employee in Knauss lost his job when his employer went bankrupt. The
trustees denied the employee's claim for pension benefits because the
employee had incurred a four year break in service. 260 The trustees in Knauss
advanced the argument that the break in service rule was necessary to ensure
261
that there would be a consistent stream of payment for covered employees.
Those continuous payments, according to the trustees, were necessary to pay
pension obligations that had accrued on the basis of past service, for which no
employer contributions had been made.262 The trustees asserted that the break
in service rule was necessary to maintain the financial viability of the plan. 263
The Third Circuit held that the evidence produced by the trustees was
insufficient to demonstrate that the break in service rule was necessary to avert
insolvency due to any unforeseen distribution of pension funds. 264 The court
stated, nevertheless, that the application of a break in service rule would be
upheld under circumstances where invalidating the rule would result in the
pension fund becoming insolvent.2 65
Despite prior court decisions to the contrary, the court in Whipp v. Seafarers
Vacation Plan,266 suggested that in order to avoid a finding that a break in
service rule is arbitrary and capricious, employers should make a distinction
between how the rule will operate in light of voluntary as opposed to
involuntary terminations. 267 The break in service rule in Whipp was
implemented "to provide [an] incentive[] for long-term employment in the...

255Id.
256433 F. Supp. 1040 (W.D. Pa. 1977), vacated, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978).
25 7

Id.at 1040-41.

258

Id.

259

1d.
260Id.
26

1Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82,90 (3d Cir. 1978).

262id.
263

1d. at 91.

264

1d. at 91; see also Tafoya, 909 F.2d at 348.

26

5Knauss, 583 F.2d at 91.

266632 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Md. 1986), rev'd, 832 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1987).
267

1d. at 1494.
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industry."268 The district court opined that the plan's failure to distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary breaks in service would not encourage
members to stay in an industry when there were no jobs available. 269 The
Fourth Circuit, however, stated that a failure to differentiate between voluntary
and involuntary breaks in service would not render a break in service rule
invalid. 270
B. Avoiding the Break in Service Rule
Some plans have sought to diminish the harsh consequences of break in
service rules by suspending the application of the rule during a "grace
period."2 71 For example, under the plan at issue in Cann v. CarpentersPension
Trust for Southern California,272 a participant could avoid the break in service
rule for up to three consecutive years if the participant could not obtain covered
employment within that time.273 The employee in Cann was involuntarily
unemployed for four years.2 74 As a result, the employee requested a suspension
of the break in service rule.275 The request was denied. 276 The employee's prior
service credits were disregarded for pension benefit purposes because of the
employee's four year break in service. 277
In Cann, the district court held that "the [trustee's] rule that grace periods for
involuntary unemployment [could] only have a length of three years [was]...
unreasonable on its face."278 The court stated that the application of the rule
punished employees for events beyond their control. 2 79 The court further
stated that the grace period did not further the interests of the trustees in
weeding out transient employees. 280 The court noted that an unlimited grace
period for involuntary unemployment would have allowed the plan to attract
and retain employees as well as avoid penalizing employees for circumstances

268I. at 1493.
269/d.
27

0Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1987).

271See, e.g.,

Cann v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 662 F. Supp. 501, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1987),

affid, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).
272Id.

273Id.
274Id.
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1d. at 503.
662 F. Supp. at 503.
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1d. at 502.
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Id. at 504.
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1d. at 504-05.
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beyond their control. 281 Thus, the three-year grace period provision would not
achieve the employer's alleged objective of retaining loyal employees.
VI. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT

Profit sharing benefits are earned income.28 2 No employer contribution is
credited to an employee unless the employee performs a service for the
employer.2 83 Forfeiture of profit sharing benefits, whether vested ornonvested,
is forfeiture of earned income. 2 84 Therefore, an employer should not be allowed
to deprive an employee of the benefits he has earned without substantial
justification.
The principal reason why employers utilize deferred profit sharing plans is
to attract and retain qualified employees. 285 Since deferred plans have a vesting
feature, employees have to remain in the plan for a term of years in order to
obtain benefits under the plan. 286 Break in service rules are instituted in profit
287
sharing plans to encourage employees to remain with the employer. An
employer does not have to utilize a break in service rule in his profit sharing
plan.288 The rule is widely utilized, nevertheless, because employers believe
that employees will remain with the organization in order to collect all their
accrued profit sharing benefits. 28 9 Aplan that withholds an employee's accrued
benefits for voluntary as well as involuntary breaks in service, however, will
who could potentially be affected by the rule to
not encourage employees 290
remain with the employer.

28

1Cann, 662 F. Supp. at 505.

282

See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (West 1994). Because some profit sharing benefits are not paid
out immediately does not mean that these benefits are not earned.
283
Raymond H. Giesecke, The Company Contribution, in GUIDE TO MODERN PROFIT
SHARING 37, 39 (1973).
284
See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
28 5

Thonander, supra note 2, at 2.

286

1.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(West 1994).

2 87

See, e.g., Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 632 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Md. 1986)
(noting trial testimony which revealed that the purpose of the pension plan was to
encourage long-term employment).
2 88

See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 397,98 Stat. 1426 (stating that a
profit sharing plan may utilize a break in service rule).
2 89
See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d
344,348 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting plaintiff's admission that theprimary purpose for a break
in service rule is encouraging industry loyalty); Whipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1493 (noting that
an objective of pension plans is to encourage long term employment).
290

See, e.g., Whipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1493.
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A natural disaster is unforeseeable. 2 91 Employees neither envision being
unemployed as a result of a natural disaster nor do they anticipate the period
of unemployment lasting for over a year.292 Under these circumstances, a break
in service rule unnecessarily punishes displaced employees. 293 The
punishment unfolds when employers exercise break in service rules to deny
the displaced employees their nonvested profit sharing benefits. 294
Employers have been relentless in justifying the application of break in
service rules against involuntarily terminated employees. 295 Employers
contend that the rule ensures that those employees who put the most into the
business will get the most out of it.296 Also, employers assert that the rule not
only weeds out transient employees but also rewards loyal employees. 297 Some
employers have also insisted that break in service rules are necessary to protect
298
the very existence of their profit sharing plans.
Federal courts have acknowledged that break in service rules serve a useful
function. 2 99 Even in cases where employees had been involuntarily terminated,
all the extenuating circumstances were considered by the court before a ruling
was made that the break in service rule was invalid.3 00 The courts have,
nonetheless, recommended that employers make a distinction in their deferred
benefit plans between how a break in service rule will operate in the case of
voluntary as opposed to involuntary terminations. 3 01 The courts have not,
however, held that an involuntary termination will automatically render a
break in service rule inapplicable.3 0 2
Some employers have voluntarily tried to diminish the negative
consequences that a break in service rule can have on involuntarily terminated

291

See BLACK'S, supra note 11.

292

See, e.g., Carlson, supranote 25.

293

See, e.g., Whipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1493.

2941d.
2 95

See, e.g., Tafoya v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 909 F.2d
344, 348 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the use of a break in service rule is a policy choice
which trustees are allowed to utilize) (citing Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan
Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301,1306 (9th Cir. 1983)); Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 90 (3d
Cir. 1978) (alleging financial necessity as the basis for using a break in service rule).
29 6
See, e.g., Knauss, 583 F.2d at 90.
29 7

See, e.g., Whipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1493.

29 8

See, e.g., Knauss, 583 F.2d at 90.

29 9

See Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309,1312 (9th Cir. 1971).
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See, e.g., Knauss, 583 F.2d at 90.
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employees. 303 For example, some employers have suspended the operation of
30 4
the rule for a limited period of time designated as a grace period. The courts
3 05 Courts have, instead,
have not embraced this limited grace period provision.
stated that an unlimited grace period should be offered, if one is to be offered
at all.30 6
The Tax Code currently allows employers to utilize a break in service rule in
their profit sharing plans. 30 7 The Tax Code, however, does not give employers
precise direction on how the rule should be applied. 308 Congress can follow
the direction of the federal courts on the issue of the application of break in
service rules to involuntary terminations. Court rulings would serve as an
appropriate foundation for a congressional amendment to the rule. A
congressional amendment should make definitive prescriptions regarding
how the rule should be applied. A congressional amendment is necessary
because the issue as to whether the rule should apply similarly to voluntary as
well as involuntary terminations has not been resolved. 3 09 The federal courts
have tried to resolve the issue, but the circuit court decisions conflict with
regard to the application of the rule and, therefore, the rule's application
310
remains ambiguous.
Application of the rule would operate to the disadvantage of employees who
break their service because of a natural disaster in a similar fashion to the
disadvantage that female workers experienced prior to 1986. The years of
service prior to a break in service were disregarded by many plans when female
workers incurred a break in service due to pregnancy. 3 11 Congress sought to
remedy the discriminatory impact of the vesting schedule on female workers
by reducing the number of years an employee was required to work in order
to be vested. 312 Similarly, because of the injustice that will and has resulted
from the application of a break in service rule to employees who are
involuntarily terminated because of a natural disaster, Congress should amend
the rule. Congress needs to make the application of the rule more precise by

303 See,

e.g., Cann v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 662 F. Supp. 501, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

4

30 Id.
30 5

1. at 504.

306

M. at 505.

30 7

1.R.C. § 411(a)(6) (West 1994).

308Id.
30 9

See, e.g., Bolton v. Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir.
1992) (evaluating whether a plan should take into account the voluntariness of a
participant's break in service).
31OId.; see also Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978).
31

1 See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,98 Stat. 1426, 1436.

312See id.
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singling out the factor or factors that will be determinative of whether a break
in service has occurred.
Congress should amend the break in service rule to require that the following
conditions be considered before the rule is applied. First, employers should
consider the circumstances that led to the termination. 313 Second, employers
should examine how a break in service rule would affect terminated
whether the rule is necessary to
employees. Third, employers should evaluate
314
ensure the financial viability of their plan.
Congress has tried to mitigate the negative effects of the rule by providing
that years of service before a break would count as service credits if the
employee returned to service with the employer and completed one year of
service.3 15 This provision was premised on employees being able to return to
covered employment.3 16 After a natural disaster has struck, an employer may
or may not be able to continue operating.317 A business that has permanently
ceased operations because of a natural disaster will have undergone what is
synonymous to a plant closure. 318 According to the Tax Code, a break in service
rule is inapplicable to employees who are terminated as a result of a plant
closing. 3 19 Thus, employees who are involuntarily terminated because of a
plant closure become fully vested; thus, they are entitled to both their vested
and nonvested profit sharing benefits.
After a natural disaster, some employers in the affected area may remain in
business, but they may operate at a reduced level with a reduced staff.320
Employees who are terminated by those employers may or may not be able to
return to work.3 21 Even though these businesses continue to function, for the
involuntarily terminated employee the effect is the same as if the business had
ceased operation. Hence, the employee who cannot return to work, through no
fault of his own, is analogous to the employee who is terminated because of a
plant closure, and should be treated accordingly. As a result, the Tax Code
should make the operation of a break in service rule inapplicable to employees
who are involuntary terminated because of a natural disaster.

3 13

See Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 632 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Md. 1986).

3 14

See, e.g., Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 91 (3d Cir. 1978).

3 15

1.R.C. § 411(a)(6) (West 1994).

316

See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,98 Stat. 1426,1436 (amending
the Tax Code, because Congress believed that a one year leave of absence was not
sufficient time for female employees to take care of personal matters).
3 17
See, e.g., Musibay, supra note 30.
3 18 See 29 U.S.C.
319
320

§ 2101(a)(2)(1988).

1.R.C. § 411(d)(3)(West 1994).
See, e.g., Fields, supra note 27, at 1C.
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Providing statutory exceptions for victims of a natural disaster is not a novel
proposition.3 22 In fact, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act specifically
states that employers are not required to give employees notice of a mass lay-off
if the lay-off ensued from a natural disaster.323 Congress should, thus, amend
the Tax Code to require that employers make a distinction in their deferred
benefit plans between how a break in service rule will operate in the case of
voluntary as opposed to involuntary terminations. The amendment should
further bar the application of a break in service rule to employees who are
involuntarily terminated as a result of a natural disaster and, through no fault
of their own, are unable to return to covered employment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Employees who incur a break in service under an employer sponsored
deferred profit sharing plan are in jeopardy of forfeiting their nonvested profit
sharing benefits when a natural disaster causes the termination of their
employment. These employees will forfeit the nonvested portion of their profit
sharing benefits if they incur a break in service and are unable to resume
employment with their employer. The Tax Code allows employers to deny
employees their nonvested benefits if the employees' incur a break in service.
The courts, on the other hand, have generally invalidated the application of
break in service rules to involuntarily terminated employees. The courts,
however, do not guarantee that in every case where an employee is
involuntarily terminated, the break in service rule will be inapplicable.
In order to preclude the forfeiture of nonvested benefits of the victims of
natural disasters, Congress should amend the break in service rule. The
amendment should prohibit the application of a break in service rule to
employees who break their service because of a natural disaster, and as a result
are incapable of resuming employment with the employer. With a
congressional amendment to the break in service rule in place, the
determination of whether an employee is entitled to his nonvested benefits
would no longer be left to the discretion of employers or plan administrators.
Instead, the amended break in service provision would ensure that employees
who have been involuntarily terminated because of a natural disaster, would
receive both their vested and nonvested profit sharing benefits.
MARIE ELLEN HAYNES
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See 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988) (excepting employers from notifying employees of mass
lay-offs that will occur due to a natural disaster).
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